Biophysical Society Bulletin | May 2020

Public Affairs

Science and Research in the Global Political Landscape: The US and China

Although the BPS Annual Meeting occurred just a short time ago, the intervening events and accompanying dramatic changes to our daily lives make it feel like a distant memory. However, the messages conveyed in the BPS Public Affairs Committee (PAC) session on the intersection of global science and research and US-China relations are acutely relevant at this moment. The session provided the background of the recent impressive growth of Chinese science and the rela- tionship of this growth to recruitment of foreign expertise. It addressed the flouting of funding agency rules by some US- based recruits and strategies that universities are developing to mitigate these offenses. Finally, the session addressed the danger that these strategies will yield unintended conse- quences of both inhibiting collaborative science and fostering racial profiling of Chinese American scientists. The PAC is grateful to the panel participants for providing their time, knowledge, and experience to inform our Biophysical Society community on this important topic. Steadily increasing growth in Chinese STEM investment is a reality that both provides opportunities for fruitful collabora- tion and challenges US dominance. Tai-Ming Chueng from the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation at University of California San Diego described the detailed plans that the Chi- nese government is implementing to gain world prominence in STEM fields. A central component of this effort is importing external expertise through combined enticement of Chinese ex-patriots with STEM expertise back to China and recruit- ment of foreign scientists through many channels such as the Thousand Talents Program. These highly competitive efforts will continue for the foreseeable future. The Chinese STEM recruitment programs have been accom- panied by a number of transgressions by US-based scientists. Michael Lauer , Deputy Director for Extramural Research at the National Institutes of Health (NIH), described multiple types of offenses. First, recruits to Chinese talent programs have not reported financial support, for both salary and research, to the NIH. Second, time commitments have not been reported to universities and funding agencies. In the most egregious cases, laboratory materials such as cell lines and intellectual property, including grant proposals, have been exchanged be- tween scientists based in the US and China. Notably, among the scientists charged with these offenses, a significant num- ber are not of Chinese descent. Finally, in many of the cited cases, no problems would have occurred had the scientists involved exercised full disclosure as stipulated by the univer- sities and funding agencies.

Given that the majority of the transgressions outlined above have involved academic scientists, universities are at the forefront of implementing best practices for prevention, while preserving legitimate collaborative STEM activities between the Unites States and China. Sandra Brown , Vice Chancellor for Research at the University of California San Diego, described the high level of research activity at that institution and its many connections with China, ranging from having the highest enrollment of Chinese students in the University of California system to hosting a large number of Chinese grad- uate students and visiting scientists in STEM fields. Efforts to mitigate the transgressions described by Lauer include increased outreach to educate faculty, students, and staff on the regulations associated with collaborative arrangements, both international and domestic. In the future, the university will practice enhanced disclosure and monitoring of compli- ance, while also subjecting collaborative arrangements to enhanced scrutiny. Implementation of these practices will be accompanied by restrictions on who can participate in what research and will heighten fears among both faculty and students. A disturbing outcome of investigations into transgressions related to STEM collaborations with China is the perception that all Asian American scientists are potentially guilty. Frank Wu of the University of California Hastings College of Law pointed out that this perception is a reflection of a historical tradition in the United States of singling out the “other,” in this case Asian Americans, for blame. Although he strongly supported actions to sanction “bad actors” involved in US-China STEM collaboration, he also emphasized the dan- ger of stigmatizing all Chinese American scientists. Unfortunately, with the arrival of the coronavirus pandemic, this stigma is in danger of being extended to all Asian Americans. The themes of the PAC session have stark implications for how the world will manage the COVID-19 pandemic and how post-COVID-19 international relations will affect scientific progress in both the United States and China. Development of effective strategies for mitigating the effects of the virus requires open collaboration among scientists throughout the world. Specifically, international collaboration with the Chinese scientists and healthcare providers who have gained first-hand experience during the Wuhan outbreak is indispen- sible to the world’s efforts at combating the pandemic.

May 2020

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